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Amenity Valuation, Incomplete Compensation and Migration 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Efficient policy decisions require comparisons of the costs of policy alternatives with their 
respective benefits.  Although policy costs (at least the explicit costs) are often readily 
quantified, the same cannot be said on the benefit side.  Economists have long known that 
market-clearing prices reflect the marginal willingness to pay for market goods.  However, there 
are a wide range of nontraditional goods, ranging from environmental goods to local public 
goods and services that are not exchanged in traditional markets.  This necessitates the use of 
techniques that can infer the marginal valuation of nonmarket goods.  
 
Over the years, economists have employed a number of methods to assign monetary values to 
these nonmarket goods.  Some of these methods rely on hypothetical market situations.  For 
example, the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) query’s survey respondents about their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for hypothetical changes in environmental goods.  Multiple regression 
analysis can then be used to disentangle the factors (both demographic and market) that 
determine WTP.  Similarly, the conjoint approach values nonmarket goods by examining 
tradeoffs that respondents would be willing to make between various bundles of nonmarket 
goods.  So long as a monetary value is one of the attributes of the bundles, then again, regression 
modeling can be used to infer implicit values for nonmarket goods from the survey responses.  If 
carefully constructed, these survey approaches can provide important insights to policymakers as 
to how environmental goods are valued in a community.  Nonetheless, there are potential caveats 
associated with reliance on stated preference approaches, resulting in part from the possibility 
that unobserved biases may exist in survey responses.  Although careful survey design can 
mitigate some of these potential biases, this problem has led some economists to advocate 
methods that examine tradeoffs in actual markets in addition to hypothetical behavior in 
simulated market situations (Clark and Kahn, 1989). 
 
The Intracity Hedonic Model 
 
Since Tiebout (1956) first suggested that residents “vote with their feet” for the local fiscal 
bundle that best satisfies their preferences, economists and regional scientists have used that 
insight to implicitly value local site attributes.  For example, Lancaster (1967) recognized that 
prices for heterogeneous goods depend on the characteristics of the good, and there were some 
early studies (e.g., Ridker and Henning, 1967; Wiend, 1973) that began to explore the 
relationship between transacted real-estate prices and locational attributes.  However, it was 
Rosen (1974) who first developed a two-stage process, applied to housing markets to first derive 
implicit prices for housing attributes, and then to derive demand functions for those attributes.  
While other authors (Brown and Rosen, 1982; Epple, 1987; Bartik, 1987) suggested that the 
unique nature of the endogeneity of housing attributes made the identification problem more 
complex than Rosen first described, dozens of studies have been conducted since Rosen’s 
seminal work.  These studies have derived values for housing characteristics (Lichtenstein and 
Kern, 1987) as well as a plethora of neighborhood characteristics including crime (Thaler, 1978), 
  2Amenities, Incomplete Compensation and Migration                                                        Clark 
air quality (Harrison and Rubinfeld, 1978), coastal amenities (Parsons and Wu, 1991; Palmquist, 
1993), neighborhood historic preservation (Clark and Herrin, 1997, Coulson and Leichenko, 
2004),  environmental risks related to earthquakes and volcanoes (Bernknopf, Brookshire and 
Thayer, 1990), flooding, nuclear power (Nelson, 1981, Clark, Michelbrink, Allison and Metz, 
1997), airport noise (Nelson, 1979), and hazardous waste (Kiel and McClain, 1995) to name just 
a few.  
 
The Intercity Hedonic Model 
 
Although some locational attributes vary within a city, others (e.g., climate) are relatively 
invariant within cities but vary substantially across cities, and an alternative hedonic framework 
has been developed to implicitly value those goods.  The foundations of the interregional 
hedonic model can actually be traced back to Adam Smith (1776) who described in his Wealth of 
Nations a relationship between the “hardship” associated with a particular job and the resulting 
market wage (Smith, 1776, Chapter 4). While labor economists have long understood this 
underlying feature of job characteristics, regional economists began to more fully explore the 
relationship between local quality-of-life factors as they relate to interregional factor prices 
beginning in the later 1970’s.  Specifically, Rosen published a paper (Rosen, 1979) that derived 
implicit valuations of local quality-of-life factors using individual wage data. Roback (1981) 
more fully developed the interregional hedonic model by recognizing that there was endogeneity 
between wages and land prices, and as a result, locational attributes can be capitalized into both 
input prices.  These insights were further refined by Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988).  In 
addition to deriving urban quality-of-life indices, the technique has been used to investigate the 
implicit valuation of noxious facilities (Clark and Nieves, 1992), and the value of professional 
sports teams (Carlino and Coulson, 2004).   
 
A variant of the Roback model focuses solely on wage differentials.  Henderson (1982) showed 
that full implicit prices can be derived from wage differentials alone as long as average land 
prices are controlled.  This is equivalent to evaluating the individual household living at the 
urban edge, where land is valued by its agricultural productivity.  This approach has been 
employed to value urban quality-of-life as it relates to city size (Clark, Kahn and Ofek, 1988; 
Herzog and Schlottmann, 1992), air quality (Cropper and Arriaga-Salinas), urban cultural 
amenities (Clark and Kahn, 1988) and other outdoor amenities (Clark and Kahn, 1989).   
 
The Potential Consequences of Interregional Disequilibrium 
  
There are three underlying assumptions that form the foundation for both the intra- and intercity 
hedonic models.  The models assume that: (a) residents are knowledgeable about the level of site 
characteristics across locations; (b) there is a continuous offering of site characteristics such that 
utility maximizing sorting between locations is possible; and (c) residents are mobile between 
locations with zero transactions costs associated with relocations. While there are certainly 
obstacles to the satisfaction of each of these assumptions, the mobility requirement is of primary 
importance since it is the movement of labor on both the demand and supply sides of the labor 
market that ultimately drives wage and land price differentials.  If residents respond quickly to 
changes in locational attributes, then labor and land markets would be expected to be in 
equilibrium both within regions (intraregional) and between regions (intraregional).  Whereas 
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intraregional equilibrium simply requires that the prices of labor and land within the region clear 
their respective local market, interregional equilibrium only exists when wages and land rent 
differentials across regions completely compensate for quality-of-life attributes. Thus, when an 
interregional equilibrium has been attained, individual utility levels are uniform across regions.  
It is the issue of interregional equilibrium that is investigated in this chapter, and to do so 
requires a more thorough investigation of the relationship between migration and amenities. 
 
The role of amenities in the household migration decision was at the heart of a spirited debate 
during the late 1970’s and 1980’s.  Some economists (Greenwood, 1985; Greenwood and Hunt, 
1989) argued that differential returns to human capital were the primary factor motivating 
interregional migration, and that ongoing net migration flows resulted from persistent 
interregional disequilibria.  Others (Graves, 1979; Graves and Linneman, 1979) countered that 
labor mobility would quickly eliminate disequilibria between regions.  Thus, rather than 
emanating from an ongoing interregional disequilibrium, Graves and Linneman argued that 
migration resulted primarily from income growth and/or life-cycle changes in the population.  
These changes result in altered demand for goods and services, some of which (e.g., amenities, 
local public services, etc.) are location-specific. Thus, the only way to satisfy these altered 
demands for site-specific goods is to migrate to another location.    
 
The outcome of this debate has important implications for amenity valuation using hedonic 
models.  If mobility is not rapid enough to generate equilibrium in interregional factor prices, 
then amenity capitalization in factor prices will be incomplete, and implicit prices will not fully 
reflect the value (i.e., willingness to pay) placed on a particular attribute by the marginal resident 
or marginal worker. That is, wage and/or land rent differentials will either be inadequate, or 
perhaps more than necessary to compensate for the local amenity mix.   
 
In this chapter, the issue of incomplete amenity capitalization is investigated.  We explore the 
theoretical foundation for the Roback model and then discuss the evidence concerning whether 
the assumption of interregional equilibrium appears to be satisfied.  We then turn to an 
investigation of the Henderson model that focuses on wage differentials.  Again, we evaluate the 
theoretical foundations of the model, and then explore the empirical evidence on interregional 
equilibrium.  We conclude with recommendations as to the application of both of these 
interregional models for amenity valuation. 
  
II.  Amenity Valuation in the Roback Framework 
 
Roback (1982) begins with the assumption that households maximize utility subject to a budget 
constraint, choosing consumption levels of goods (x), land (d), and quality of life amenities (Q): 
 
Maximize U=U(x,d;Q)  (1a) 
 
Subject to: w=x+r*d  (1b)  
 
Optimizing with respect to choice variables and substituting optimal x and d into equation (1a) 
gives the indirect utility function which expresses utility levels as a function of price of land (r), 
the price of x (considered a numeraire), income (w) and the exogenous amenity level (Q): 




Turning to the firm side of the market, if amenity levels are exogenous to the firm (e.g., climate), 
then the implicit value of the amenity is determined solely by households.  Alternatively, some 
local amenities are endogenously determined by firm actions (e.g., air quality).  In that case, an 
amenity improvement can only be achieved at a cost to firms.  To show this, assume that firms 
spatially minimize the cost of production, C(x) determined by expenditure on labor, (L) and land 
(d), subject to a production constraint; 
 
 
Minimize C(x)=w*L + r*D  (2a) 
s.t. x=x(L,D;Q)  (2b) 
 
Under conditions of constant returns to scale, firms equate unit production costs to the price of 
commodity x (assumed to be unitary) giving the equilibrium unit cost function: 
 
1=c(w,r;Q)   (2c) 
 
Roback (1982) simultaneously solves equations (1c) and (2c) to identify a spatial equilibrium 
and an implicit amenity price.  Spatial equilibrium implies that neither firms, nor households can 
make themselves better off by relocating.  That is, firms cannot lower costs, and households 
cannot increase utility by moving to alternative locations.  Thus, amenities are implicitly priced 
by the following equation: 
 
γ = D*∂r/∂Q - ∂w/∂Q (3) 
 
Graphically this is seen in Figure 1 where a nonproductive amenity (i.e. an amenity that does not 
influence the production function) improves from Q1 to Q2.  Households accept lower wages 
(wages fall from w1 to w2) and are willing to pay higher rents (rents rise from r1 to r2).  The 
implicit price is then simply the sum of the change in expenditure on land and the negative of the 
change in expenditure on labor.    
 










Figure 1:  Equilibrium Wage and Rent Differentials
(Amenity with No Productivity Effects)
 
 
Alternatively, when an amenity has productivity effects (e.g., assume that higher amenity levels 
increase firm productivity), then both the unit cost and the indirect utility functions shift, as seen 
in Figure 2.  Specifically, the unit cost function shifts to the northeast since firms must now pay 
higher wages and/or rents to maintain unit costs when the firm is more productive at higher 
amenity levels.  In this circumstance, the impact on rents is unambiguously positive, but the 












Figure 2:  Equilibrium Wage and Rent Differentials




In Figure 2, the shift in the unit cost function is stronger than the shift in the indirect utility 
function, leading to an increase in the wage.  On the other hand, if an amenity was unproductive 
(i.e., it shifted the unit cost function to the southwest), the wage would be unambiguously 
reduced, but the effect on land prices would be uncertain. 
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Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) enhance the Roback model in several ways.  First, their 
model permits city size to be endogenous.  Second, they no longer assume that amenity levels 
remain uniform within a region.  Rather, some amenities (e.g., air quality) may vary within and 
between regions.  Finally, they introduce a production function for housing, and describe the 
implicit price in terms of housing (as opposed to land) expenditures and wage expenditures.  
 
Finally, Mathur and Stein (1991) further expand on the interregional hedonic model by 
developing a general equilibrium model of wages and land rents that allows utility levels, certain 
amenity levels, and population to be endogenous between regions.  Migration then becomes the 
equilibrating mechanism that eventually restores regional equilibrium.  Significantly, they show 
that “in disequilibrium … there is a wedge between amenity differentials and the corresponding 
earnings and housing price differentials”.  The magnitude of any disequilibrium on implicit price 
calculations becomes an empirical issue.   
 
Empirical Studies employing the Roback Approach 
 
A number of empirical studies have utilized the methodology first outlined by Roback.  As 
previously noted, Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) extended Roback’s model theoretically, 
and empirically, they developed an urban quality of life index using the 1980 Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.  They focused on 
253 metropolitan counties and derived implicit prices for amenities related to climate, air quality, 
crime, educational quality, hazardous waste, and central city status.  A quality of life index was 
computed as the sum of each amenity level times its implicit price.  Clark and Nieves (1994) also 
applied the Roback model to 1980 PUMS data to generate implicit prices for various types of 
noxious activity.  However, instead of focusing solely on metropolitan counties, they evaluated 
both urban and rural geographic areas (i.e., defined in the PUMS as Public Use Microdata Areas, 
or PUMA’s).   In addition to noxious facility densities
1 they also controlled for measures of 
climate, population density, crime, air quality and manufacturing employment, fiscal measures of 
taxation and spending, as well as a number of disequilibrium controls.  More recently, Carlino 
and Coulson (2004) used the methodology to derive implicit prices for NFL Sports franchises.   
They used data from the Annual Housing Survey, and the Current Population Survey for various 
years and estimated a pooled cross-sectional/time-series model.  In addition to the sports 
franchise measures, the models also control for numerous local amenity measures related to 
neighborhood quality, climate and local fiscal burden.   
 
All of the aforementioned studies assume the existence of interregional equilibrium in the 
interregional hedonic model.  However, several studies began to more fully evaluate the nature 
of disequilibrium and its impact on migration and on implicit prices.  Berger and Blomquist 
(1992) use data from the 1980 PUMS to derive quality of life indices from both housing price 
and wage differentials.  The hedonic housing price and wage functions both incorporate 
disequilibrium controls, permitting an estimate of the degree of disequilibrium in the implicit 
price.  They then derived disequilibrium differences in wages and housing prices for various 
regions, as well as equilibrium differences in quality of life measures for those regions to 
                                                 
1 These facilities included nuclear, gas, and coal-fired power plants, chemical weapons storage facilities, hazardous 
waste sites, refineries, radioactive contaminated sites, and liquefied natural gas storage facilities. 
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determine how equilibrium and disequilibrium factors influence the decision to move, and the 
destination of the mover.  They find that the probability of moving (i.e., changing counties) 
increases with the potential disequilibrium gains in wages from moving, although disequilibrium 
housing price, and equilibrium quality of life factors were not found to matter in the decision to 
move.  When examining the destination choice, both equilibrium quality of life, and 
disequilibrium wage and housing price differentials were all found to be significant determinants 
of the choice of destination.  This study is both disconcerting and comforting.  On the one hand, 
it suggests that there are regional disequilibria that influence wage and housing price 
differentials, implying that assumption of equilibrium that was made in earlier studies is not 
warranted.  However, it also suggests that both equilibrium and disequilibrium differentials 
between regions serve as an important signal to migrants, and hence one would expect regional 
disequilibria to eventually dissipate. 
 
A second study by Greenwood, Hunt, Rickman and Treyz, (1991) takes an alternative approach.  
They note that if an interregional equilibrium exists, then compensating differentials in wages 
and housing prices can be used to value amenity levels.  That is, the implicit price derived from 
these differentials represents the marginal value (i.e., marginal willingness to pay) of the 
amenity.  However, if the adjustment toward equilibrium is slow, then the implicit price 
calculations do not reflect true compensating differentials that equalize utility spatially.  Rather, 
these differentials would be expected to either over- or under-compensate for the specific 
amenity mix.  Greenwood et. al. show that the true compensating differential is that differential 
that would generate zero net in-migration to a region, other things equal.  Thus, the authors use 
statewide data on income, housing prices, and migration over the period 1971-1988 to compute 
the equilibrium compensating differentials (i.e., the true marginal willingness to pay).  These 
differentials are then compared with the implicit price derived from actual housing price and 
income differentials.  They show that some states are classified as “amenity rich”, meaning that 
the implicit price overstates the equilibrium compensating differential (i.e., over-compensation 
exists) whereas other states are amenity poor, or under-compensate for their amenity mix.  This 
confirms the finding of Berger and Blomquist (1992) that at least some regions offer incomplete 
compensation, given their amenity bundle.  However, they then compare the classification of 
amenity rich and amenity poor regions based on their estimates of the true equilibrium 
compensating differentials with the classification that would be derived from implicit price 
calculations of Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988), that incorrectly assume regional 
equilibrium.   They find that the differences in classifications are minor.  This suggests that 
although the assumption of equilibrium across regions is not empirically borne out in the data, 
the bias to the implicit price that is introduced by the equilibrium assumption is likely to be 
minimal. 
 
III.  Theory of Interregional Amenity Wage Capitalization 
 
Rosen published a paper in 1979 that derived an urban quality of life index from real urban wage 
differentials, and Henderson (1982) expanded upon that model by formally developing the 
conditions under which implicit prices reflect household willingness to pay.  Like the Roback 
framework, the Henderson model derives implicit prices from the joint interaction of firms and 
workers in the labor market.  While Henderson recognizes that cost of living differences are also 
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important, it is shown that under certain circumstances, all of the amenity capitalization can be 
reflected in the compensating wage differential.  The model is briefly described below.  
 
Households are assumed to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint where households 
purchase housing (h) and other goods, x (priced as a numeraire).  As was the case in the Roback 
model, the amenity or quality-of-life level (Q) is assumed to be exogenously determined.  Thus, 
the model assumes that households: 
 
Maximize: U(x,h;Q)  (4a) 
 
Subject to: w=x + Ph*h   (4b) 
 
Again, by optimizing with respect to x and h, and substituting optimal values of these choice 




If an interregional equilibrium exists, utility is fixed at V
1, and thus the implicit function theorem 





The wage-acceptance function is shown in Figure 1, and can be used to describe the tradeoff 
between wages and amenities that maintains household indifference between two locations with 





*∂Ph/∂Q  + ∂wA/∂Q  (7) 
 
This indicates that wages differ spatially for one of two reasons:  (a) housing prices vary (i.e., 
cost-of-living effects), or (b) locational amenities differ across space.  Thus, the two terms on the 
right-hand side of equation (7) shows two effects.  The first term has two components; (∂wA/∂Ph) 
which is positive since higher cost-of-living from more expensive housing necessitates higher 
wages if the individual is to be indifferent between the two sites, and (∂Ph/∂Q) which is also 
positive since higher amenity levels drive up the average housing price in the community.  
Overall, the first term is expected to be positive.  The second term (∂wA/∂Q) is negative, 
reflecting the tradeoff between the amenity level and the wage.  This term gives the marginal 
willingness to pay (i.e., equilibrium compensating differential) for small changes in the amenity, 
Q.  Whereas dwA/dQ is of an indeterminant sign, ∂wA/∂Q is unambiguously negative.  A key 
insight by Henderson (1982) is that if we control for the average housing price in the estimation 
of equation (6), we can isolate ∂wA/∂Q.  That is, by controlling for the average amenity level, we 
are focusing on that individual who lives at the edge of the city.  Since land prices at the city 
edge reflect agricultural productivity (assumed to be uniform), then any compensating 
differential for differential amenities must be reflected in wage differentials.  If we allow for 
individual preferences to differ, then there will be a family of wage-acceptance functions that 
reflect those preference differences.  This different taste groups are shown in Figure 3 as WA1, 
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WA2 and WA3.  In equilibrium, individuals will sort themselves such that the utility levels of their 
individual taste group are spatially invariant.  Those with the strongest preferences for the 
amenity (e.g., taste group WA3) will be willing to pay more for the amenity (i.e., accept more in 
wage reductions) than other taste groups.   
 
On the firm side, there may be comparable wage-amenity tradeoffs that maintain constant costs 
to firms.  If the amenity is endogenous to firms, improvements in the amenity can only be 
achieved at increased cost.  Such would be the case for example with the air quality amenity.  
Thus, in equilibrium, firms would pay lower wages so as to offset the cost associated with the 
amenity improvement.  This is wage-amenity relationship is shown in Figure 3 by firm-offer 
functions (Fo1, Fo2, Fo3), where the different curves represent firms with different production 
functions.  Similar to the consumer side, those firms locating in the high amenity locations (e.g., 
firm production group Fo3) would be those firms with production technologies that permit them 
to produce the amenity (e.g., better air quality) at lowest cost.   
 
In equilibrium, the wage-acceptance and firm offer functions interact to form an equilibrium 
reduced-form function known as the wage-opportunity locus (Wo in Figure 3) .  Note that if the 
amenity is exogenous (e.g., climate), then the wage opportunity locus is simply the lower 
envelope of the various wage-acceptance functions.  As long as there is a continuous offering of 
amenities and taste groups, the slope of the wage-acceptance function (which reflects the 
marginal willingness to pay for the amenity) is the same as the slope of the wage-opportunity 








Figure 3: Wage-Acceptance Function, Firm-Offer









When an interregional equilibrium exists, the wage-amenity tradeoff is given by the wage-
opportunity function.  Suppose instead that there is overcompensation.  That is, suppose that the 
wage at amenity level Q3 is W3’.  In equilibrium, only W3 is required to compensate for amenity 
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level Q3.  This raises three issues.  First, there is a motivation to move to the location with 
amenity level Q3 since utility levels are higher at that location than other areas.  Second, those 
wage differentials would be expected to be diminished as households and/or firms responded to 
the differential.  Specifically, firms would be expected to exit, lowering demand for labor, and 
households would be expected to enter, raising the supply of labor, until the wage moves back to 
W3.  Finally, if the disequilibrium influence is not recognized, then the observed wage-
opportunity locus would not equal Wo.  Rather, if would expected to flatten, thereby distorting 
the estimate of the true willingness to pay.   
 
Empirical Studies Employing the Intercity Hedonic Wage Approach 
 
There have been a number of empirical studies that derive implicit values of local amenities and 
site characteristics by examining wage differentials.  For example, Cropper and Arriaga-Salinas 
(1980) use an intercity hedonic wage model to derive estimates of marginal willingness to pay 
for air quality improvements; Clark, Kahn and Ofek (1988), derive an urbanization deflator of 
the U.S. GNP by examining the relationship between wages and urban city size; and Gyourko 
and Tracy (1991) derive implicit prices for urban fiscal goods and tax prices.  Likewise, Clark 
and Kahn evaluated the marginal willingness to pay for outdoor recreational amenities (1989) as 
well as urban cultural amenities (1988).  All of these studies assume the existence of an 
interregional equilibrium.  However, Herzog and Schlottmann (1993) suggested that estimates of 
the marginal willingness to pay for urban amenities, specifically those related to city size, may 
be distorted by disequilibrium in urban labor markets.  Using the 1980 Public Use Microdata 
Sample, they derive hedonic wage functions and then examine the implicit valuations implied by 
those estimates.  They then estimate an individual out-migration function that is dependent upon 
the amenity levels, cost of living levels, and the “prospective wage”.  The prospective wage is 
that wage that which is necessary to compensate for the local site characteristics, given 
individual human capital levels, and is derived from the hedonic wage function. 
      
M=M(Wp,Ph(Q),Px,Q)   (8) 
 
The variable M represents an individual migration dummy variable (1=outmigration, 
0=otherwise), Wp is the prospective wage, Ph is the price of housing, and Px is the price of other 
goods.  By totally differentiating equation (8), and setting dPh=dPx=dM=0, and solving for 
ΜWp/ΜQ, we derive the true equilibrium marginal willingness to pay.  Comparing the marginal 
willingness to pay with the implicit value derived from the hedonic wage model, Herzog and 
Schlottmann show that implicit markets for amenities do not appear to be in equilibrium.  Like 
the findings of Greenwood, Hunt, Rickman and Treyz (1991), these findings also cast doubt on 
the accuracy of estimates derived from models that simply assume equilibrium. 
 
To assess whether the existence of regional disequilibria result in signals for migrants, a recent 
study by Clark, Herrin, Knapp and White (2003) employs a three-step procedure applied to data 
from the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.  In 
the first stage, Henderson’s wage opportunity locus is estimated.  Specifically, the individual 
annual earnings are regressed on a vector of human capital characteristics for that individual (Xi), 
the median housing value in city j (MVj) as required in the Henderson wage model, and city 
fixed effects, aj.   
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ln(annual wage income) = ∃Xi + ∀*MVj + ∗aj + eij   (9) 
 
Note that equation (9) is estimated without an intercept term so that all citywide fixed effects can 
be estimated.  The coefficient on the fixed effects reflect the capitalization of amenities, fiscal 
goods, as well as disequilibrium effects reflecting incomplete compensation for the amenity.  To 
separate the equilibrium from the disequilibrium effects in the fixed effects, the second stage 
model regresses the parameter estimates of the fixed effects (∗j) on a vector of citywide 
amenities and fiscal characteristics (Qj) as shown in equation (10). 
 
∗j =(Qj + uj (10) 
 
By accounting for the contribution of the locational attributes (Qj) (i.e., systematic equilibrium 
compensation due to quality of life factors), the residuals of the model should provide estimates 
of the degree of systematic undercompensation or overcompensation.  That is, if the residual for 
any given city is positive, that implies that the locational attributes underestimated the true fixed 
effect, and hence workers in the city are overcompensated in the wage for the local amenity mix. 
The third stage model evaluates the influence of the degree of over-compensation and under-
compensation on the likelihood of a move.  The 1990 PUMS data identifies the metropolitan area 
of residence in 1985 and 1990.  Clark, et. al. (2003) evaluate a sample of mobile householders 
(i.e., those household heads who have changed houses over the period).  Some of these 
individuals moved within the city in which they resided and are classified as nonmigrants 
(Migr=0), whereas other changed cities and are hence defined as migrants (Migr=1).  From this 
sample, the following binary logit model is estimated: 
 
Prob(Migr)i,o,d = 0Xi  + ϑQo,d + ΒOCo,d + ∆UCo,d   (11) 
 
From equation 11, the likelihood of migration of individual i, between some origin (o) and 
destination (d) is dependent on a vector of individual characteristics (Xi), a vector of locational 
attributes at the origin and destination (Qo,d), and the degree of overcompensation (OCo,d) and 
undercompensation (UCo,d), again defined at the origin and the destination.  If the decision to 
migrate is an efficient equilibrating mechanism, then overcompensation at the origin should 
decrease the likelihood of a move from a city, whereas overcompensation at the destination 
should increase the likelihood of migration.  In contrast, undercompensation at the origin should 
increase the likelihood of out-migration, whereas undercompensation at the destination should 
decrease the likelihood of out-migration.  The empirical findings bear out these predictions with 
all coefficients on the overcompensation and undercompensation variables found to be of the 
expected sign and highly significant.  Migrants appear to be significantly repelled from their 
origin site by high levels of undercompensation at the origin and the opposite is true when the 
origin overcompensates for amenities.   Likewise, high levels of overcompensation at the 
destination significantly increase the likelihood of an intermetropolitan migration, whereas high 
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Testing Persistence in Regional Disequilibria 
 
While the Clark, Herrin, Knapp and White (2003) findings suggest the existence of regional 
disequilibria in labor markets, they also suggest that migration behavior mitigates the 
disequilibrium problem.  Thus, an important question is whether regional disequilibria appear to 
be persistent over time.  To test this hypothesis, a net migration model of the following form was 
estimated for 603 metropolitan counties.
2
 
NetMigRatei = ∀ + ∃Empl.Growth +  ∗Qi + (OCi + 0UCi
 
NetMigRatei represents the county net migration rate over the period 1995-2000;  Empl.Growth 
is the growth in total employment over the period 1985-1995; Qi is a vector of amenity, fiscal 
and racial/ethnic measures that existed in 1995; and OCi and UCi are the undercompensation and 
overcompensation measures that were derived by Clark et. al., (2003).  Complete data 
descriptions and data sources are provided in Table 1.  If labor markets adjust relatively quickly 
to regional disequilibria, then one would expect the coefficients ( and 0 to be statistically 
insignificant.   
                                                 
2 Some metropolitan counties were omitted due to incomplete data on explanatory variables.   
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Table 1- Variable Definitions and Data Sources
a
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Net Migration rate  Difference between the total number of in and out- 
migrants to/from the county between 1995-2000 
divided by 1995 population 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
– 2000 U.S. Census of 




Growth in total employment in the metropolitan area 
between 1985 and 1995. 
U.S. Bureau of Economic 





Number of heating degree days - 65° average for the 
MSA – 30 year averages  




Number of cooling degree days - 65° average for the 
MSA– 30 year average [1329.303, 842.788] 




Average July – average January temperature – 30 year 
average for the MSA. 




Average hours of sunshine per day – 30 year average 
for the MSA  
NOAA – Comparative 
Climate Data 
Average Humidity – 
July  
Average relative humidity level in July – 30 year 
average for the MSA  
NOAA – Comparative 
Climate Data 
Average Inches of 
Snowfall 
Average annual snowfall in inches – 30 year average 
for the MSA  
NOAA – Comparative 
Climate Data 
Average Inches of 
Precipitation 
Average annual inches of precipitation – 30 year 
average for the MSA  




Dummy variable =1 if the county is on an ocean coast   U.S. Department of 
Agriculture – ERS 
database. 
County Crime Index  Total crime rate for the county for 1995  FBI Uniform Crime 
Report 
Central City Dummy  Dummy variable =1 if the county contains a central city 
for the metropolitan area.  
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
definition 
Population Density  County population in 1995 divided by county land area.  U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Percent Black   Percent of county population that is black in 1992.   U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Percent Hispanic  Percent of the county population that is Hispanic in 
1992.  
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Presence of Major 
League Sports 
Franchise 
Dummy variable=1 if there is Major League Sports 




Dummy variable =1 if MSA is in nonattainment of 





Dummy variable =1 if MSA is in nonattainment of 





Dummy variable =1 if MSA is in nonattainment of 10 
particulate matter standards; 0=otherwise. 
U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 
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Table 1(continued) – Variable Definitions and Data Sources
a
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Per Capita Other 
Local Tax Revenues 
County per capita total municipal tax liability less the 
property tax in 1992 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Per Capita Property 
Tax Revenues 




County per capita expenditures on local schools in 
1992 (1982 dollars)  




County per capita expenditures on municipal streets, 
sidewalks, bridges, etc. in 1992 (1982 dollars) 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Per Capita 
Spending – Police 
County per capita expenditures on municipal police in 
1992 (1982 dollars)  
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Per Capita 
Spending – Fire 
County per capita expenditures on firefighting in 1992 
(1982 dollars)  




County per capita expenditures on sewerage and 
sanitation in 1992 (1982 dollars) 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Overcompensation  Degree of overcompensation in the metropolitan area in 
the county 1990 
Derived from Clark, 
Herrin, Knapp and White, 
2003. 
Undercompensation  Degree of undercompensation in the metropolitan area 
in the county 1990 
Derived from Clark, 
Herrin, Knapp and White, 
2003. 
aThanks to John Carruthers for providing a database that assembled fiscal data, and census data at the county 
level over time. 
 
The regression findings are reported in Table 2.  The model is found to have heteroskedasticity, 
and is corrected using White’s consistent variance estimator. The model explains 48.1% of the 
variation in NetMigRatei. Specifically, the Metropolitan Employment Growth (1985-1995) has a 
positive and significant coefficient as expected.
3  Among the climate measures, the Average 
Hours of Sunshine has a positive and significant impact on net migration, as does the Average 
Inches of Precipitation (at the 10% level of significance). The Average July Humidity level 
negatively affects the net migration rate, but only at the 10% level of significance in a one-tailed 
test.   
 
Turning to other amenities and disamenities, the Presence of a Major League Sports Team has a 
positive and significant influence on net in-migration, and the County Crime Index has a negative 
and significant influence.  Measures of air quality are statistically insignificant, as is a dummy 
variable for being located on an Ocean Coast.  Two additional controls are added to capture 
unmeasured influences related to urban scale (Population Density) and Central City location.  
The Population Density variable is positive and just below significance at the 10% level in a 
two-tailed test.  This suggests that density is on-net capturing net-amenities associated with more 
densely populated areas (e.g., better cultural amenities).  On the other hand, net in-migration is 
detrimentally affected by a Central City dummy variable.  This is likely reflecting the ongoing 
tendency for metropolitan areas to decentralize. 
                                                 
3 The metropolitan, as opposed to the county-wide total employment growth rate is employed because workers in a 
particular county are assumed to compete for jobs throughout the metropolitan area. 
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Table 2:  Net Migration Rate Regression – Metropolitan Counties 
Dependent Variable: County Net Migration Rate 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Expected 
Sign 
Intercept  -0.021329 0.037408 -0.570   
Employment Growth and Amenities/Disamenities 
Metropolitan Employment Growth  0.002080 0.000206  10.096  + 
Heating Degree Days  4.25E-07 5.44E-06 0.078  - 
Cooling Degree Days  7.33E-06 6.81E-06 1.076  - 
Tempdiff (Avg. Jan – Avg. July)  -0.000728 0.000772 -0.943  - 
Average Hours Sunshine  0.000435 9.62E-05 4.521  + 
Average Humidity – July  -0.000339 0.000230 -1.473  - 
Average Inches of Snowfall  -4.24E-05 0.000205 -0.207  - 
Average Inches of Precipitation  0.000256 0.000137 1.863  ? 
Major League Sports Team  0.021193 0.005666 3.741  + 
Particulate Matter – 
Nonattainment Area 
0.013092 0.014293 0.916  - 
Ozone – Nonattainment Area  0.004033 0.006625 0.609  - 
Sulfur – Nonattainment Area  -0.017599 0.011475 -1.534  - 
County Crime Index – 1995  -2.74E-07 1.07E-07 -2.559  - 
Ocean Coastal Dummy Variable  0.000284 0.006266 0.045  + 
Population Density  3.40E-06 2.08E-06 1.641  ? 
Central City Dummy Variable  -0.015342 0.004462 -3.438  ? 
Racial/Ethnic Characteristics 
Percent Black – 1992  -0.001071 0.000218 -4.912  ? 
Percent Hispanic – 1992  -0.001079 0.000297 -3.632  ? 
Fiscal Variables 
Per Capita Local Other Tax 
Revenue – 1992 
-3.18E-05 1.88E-05 -1.688  - 
Per Capita Local Property Tax 
Revenue – 1992 
4.46E-05 1.42E-05 3.143  - 
Per Capita Expenditure on Police 
– 1992 
1.74E-05 9.58E-05 0.181  + 
Per Capita Expenditure on Fire - 
1992 
-4.07E-05 1.87E-05 -2.173  + 
Per Capita Expenditure on 
Education - 1992 
-0.000705 0.000116 -6.097  + 
Per Capita Local Expenditure on 
Highways - 1992 
3.30E-05 6.36E-05 0.520  + 
Per Capita Local Expenditure on 
Sewer and Sanitation – 1992 
-0.000142 4.94E-05 -2.864  + 
Undercompensation  0.001365 0.001378 0.990  + 
Overcompensation  0.001841 0.001554 1.184  - 
N=603 
R
2 = 0.511        R
2
adj=0.488 
AIC = -3.144   SC=-2.958 
Log Likelihood:  1022.109, F=23.263 
 
  16Amenities, Incomplete Compensation and Migration                                                        Clark 
Two measures of racial and ethnic concentration (i.e., Percent Black, Percent Hispanic) both 
have negative and significant impacts on the net migration rate.   
 
An examination of the findings on fiscal measures generates some interesting results.  The tax 
measures (Per Capita Property Tax and Per Capita Other Tax) have opposite impacts on net in-
migration.  Per Capita Other Tax has a negative and significant influence on net migration (5% 
significance level in a one-tailed test) as expected, whereas the Per Capita Property Tax measure 
has an unexpected positive impact, and its t-score is 3.1.  While the specification controls for 
spending levels, this finding suggests that the property tax burden is likely capturing other 
unmeasured benefits from spending.  On the spending side, none of the spending categories show 
positive and significant impacts on migration.  Rather, Per Capita Expenditure on Education, 
Fire Protection, and Sewer and Sanitation all have negative and statistically significant (2-tailed 
test) impacts on the net migration rate.  Clearly, there does not appear to be a positive 
relationship between spending levels and perceived quality of the public services. 
 
Finally, the two measures of incomplete compensation, (Undercompensation, 
Overcompensation) are both positive, but statistically insignificant determinants of county-wide 
net in-migration rates. Thus, even though the assumption of regional equilibrium is not supported 
by several wage studies, (Henderson, 1982, Herzog and Schlottmann, 1993; Clark, Herrin, 
Knapp and White, 2003), these findings do suggest that labor markets eventually adjust.  That is, 
the disequilibrium signals that existed in 1990 (Clark et. al., 2003) appear to have been 
sufficiently dissipated by interregional household mobility, and they do not appear to influence 
migration rates in the latter part of the 1990’s.     
 
IV.  Conclusions and Research Implications 
 
In this chapter, we explored interregional models of amenity valuation.  These models, which 
have evolved since their inception in the late 1970’s, provide important tools for policymakers 
who are trying to implicitly value nonmarket goods.  Although the early studies that employed 
these techniques made the assumption that regional labor and land markets were in equilibrium, 
we now know that the equilibrium assumption is overly simplistic.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
regional factor markets do not instantaneously adjust to equilibrium after shocks.  However, it is 
also clear that they do adjust, and the adjustment takes place relatively quickly. The empirical 
findings reported in this chapter suggest that the signals to migrate, which appeared to be 
relatively strong in 1990, no longer appear to influence the net migration rate just five years later.   
 
I close with two points.  First, although the assumption of equilibrium between regions is not 
supported empirically, this does not necessitate the abandonment of these techniques.  Indeed, 
Greenwood, Hunt, Rickman and Treyz (1991) and Herzog and Schlottmann, (1993) have both 
suggested modifications to these approaches that more thoroughly model the feedback effects of 
migration on the estimation of implicit prices, and hence allow estimates of the marginal 
willingness to pay for local quality of life factors to be accurately derived.  By making use of 
these modifications, true estimates of the utility preserving marginal willingness to pay can be 
derived.  Second, while we recognize that the faulty assumption of interregional equilibrium has 
driven a wedge between the implicit price and the marginal willingness to pay estimates, the 
biases introduced appear to be mitigated by the self-correcting nature of regional factor markets.  
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Workers are not oblivious to interregional welfare differences, and firms do not ignore 
interregional cost differentials.  Thus, although these markets may not be in equilibrium at any 
given point in time, it is likely that they continually adjust towards equilibrium, suggesting that 
even the early studies that assumed equilibrium may have generated reasonable estimates of 
marginal willingness to pay for local amenities.  
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